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1. Introduction
This paper aims to critique some of the legal principles under which industrial disputes
are resolved in India.  The contents of the paper are divided into two parts.  The first part, which
is largely descriptive, begins by listing some aspects of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  This
legislation operates by judicially intervening in the contract of employment in the event of a
substantial dispute between employers and employees and aims to ensure an equitable outcome
to the dispute.  The role of trade unions in India is briefly discussed in this context, and the
section concludes by posing some questions regarding the efficacy of the Industrial Disputes
Act.  The second part of the paper attempts to discern the impact of the law on the process of
reaching agreements by placing the discussion around the positive and normative consequences
of the law.  The discussion in this paper is confined to the class of issues where labour and their
employers can gain by co-operating but run into a tussle over the precise apportioning of gain,
compelling the analysis to be organised around the Nash solution to the bargaining problem.
After a brief narration of the normative content of the Nash bargaining solution, it is shown that
the constraints imposed by Indian labour law in the quest for justice, encourage outcomes which
signify normative effects of a dubious nature.  It is also pointed out that the institutional
constraints created by the Industrial Disputes Act, act not only to encourage inefficient
outcomes, but can also have the additional effect of stalling agreements.  Finally it is suggested
that instead of intervening judicially, it might be preferable to give workers rights that improve
their bargaining position and enable them to directly interact with their employers.
The Industrial Disputes Act 1947, among other things, provides the basis for settling
disputes that may arise between employers and employees.  A typical list of disputes that are
covered by the Act include discharge or dismissal of workers, interpretation of standing orders,
wages, bonus, conditions of work, rationalisation, lay-offs and retrenchments.
1  According to the
Act if concerned parties are unable to resolve a dispute, they have several options open to them.
One possibility is to set up a so called Works Committee consisting of workers and employers
which tries to sort out the dispute.
2  However since the recommendations of such committees do
                                                          
    
1. The Industrial Disputes Act 1947 Section 2(k). Also the second and third schedules of the Industrial Disputes
Act.
    
2. Id Section 32
not have any legal standing, this route of resolving disputes is very rare.
3  The more common
option is to initiate a process called conciliation, which involves the active participation of the
government.  The government steps into the picture, if one of the disputing parties asks for it and
the government considers the demand valid or alternatively if a dispute appears to be persistent
in the perception of the government.
4    Initially, a conciliation officer from the labour
department
5 or a board of conciliation appointed by the government if the dispute is particularly
complex,
6 is required to try working out a settlement.  A settlement, though binding on all
parties, does not have the same status as a court order.  As a consequence it is widely believed
that conciliation is viewed as just a stage before adjudication.
7  If a settlement is not worked out,
a failure report is tabled by the conciliation officer or board.
8  At this point, parties to a dispute
can ask for an arbitrator to resolve the conflict,
9 but this is again not very common as the award
of the arbitrator does not have legal standing.
10  Instead, proceedings then move to the final stage
called adjudication, upon a reference being made by the government.
11  The Industrial Disputes
Act gives the government the power to appoint labour courts and tribunals to adjudicate
disputes.
12   There are three kinds of courts - labour courts, industrial tribunals and national
tribunals.  Labour courts deal with relatively minor matters and concerns that affect less than 100
workmen, while disputes of greater import are looked after by industrial tribunals.  These bodies
consist of a person who is or has been a judge of a High Court or has been a district or additional
district judge for a period not less than three years.  The judgements and awards of labour courts
and tribunals are final and not subject to regular appeal.  If some party to a dispute is not
satisfied with the judgement or award, they can move for special leave appeal to the Supreme
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India or seek writ jurisdictions of the relevant
High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.  Broadly speaking, these
steps can be taken only on the grounds that the judgement or award of the labour court/tribunal
is inconsistent or faulty on a substantial point of the law.
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2. The Industrial Disputes Act and the Contract of Employment
Judicial Intervention in the Contract of Employment under the Industrial Disputes Act
As a point of departure into the many implications of the Industrial Disputes Act, it
might be useful for a moment to look at the background behind the legislation of the Act.
Around the time of the Indian independence, legislators faced the choice between orienting the
labour law towards a system where collective bargaining between unions and employers would
be encouraged, or developing a legal system that would emphasise judicial intervention in the
resolution of labour conflicts.  Protagonists favouring the latter approach won, on the grounds
that this approach would better serve the cause of social justice.  It was felt that social justice
would be best administered by a labour judiciary because it would keep in mind the power
position and susceptibilities of workers.
13  The country already had a legislation on hand - the
Defence of India Rule 81-A, that provided the basic structure of the Industrial Disputes Act.  The
British Government had enacted the Defence of India Rule 81-A to ensure that industrial
disputes did not disrupt the war effort.   Among its provisions was the facility of referring
industrial disputes to adjudicators, and thus with a few minor changes the Defence of India Rule
81-A became the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947.
To get a sense of the role that the labour courts and tribunals were envisioned to play in
the task of ensuring social justice, it is instructive to look at some of the early judgements of the
Supreme Court of India.  In fact before the Supreme Court was set up, a judgement of the
Federal Court - Western India Automobile Association v The Industrial Tribunal Bombay and
others, provided the basic parameters that have come to define Indian Labour Law.
14  The issue
raised in this case was whether an industrial tribunal can direct the employer to re-instate a
worker.    The judgement said that while a civil court could not re-instate an employee, an
industrial tribunal most definitely could do so.  It was pointed out that the object of adjudication
was to substitute for strikes and lock-outs by doing justice to the workers claim, and that this
could not be done if the focus was going to be on the enforcement of contractual agreements.
Instead it was felt that the law was so structured that industrial tribunals adopted a different
approach to the problem.   The tribunals were in effect creating new rights since they are
empowered to modify or change existing contracts and thus existing contracts could be
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14. Western India Automobile Association 1949 I L.L.J 2454
overwritten.   A ratification of this judgement was made in one of the early Supreme Court
judgements - Bharat Bank Ltd v Their employees.
15  To quote
"It is its [Tribunals] duty to adjudicate on a serious dispute between employers
and employees as affecting their right of freedom of contract and it can impose
liabilities of a pecuniary nature and disobedience of its award is made
punishable.  The powers exercisable by a tribunal of the nature were considered
in a judgement of the Federal Court of India in Western India Automobile
Association v Industrial Tribunal Bombay, and it was observed that such a
tribunal can do what no court can, namely add to alter the terms or conditions of
the contract of service.  The tribunal having been entrusted with the duty of
adjudicating a dispute of a particular character, it is for this reason that it is armed
with the extraordinary powers."
16
Another passage from the same judgement says
"In settling the disputes between the employers and workmen, the function of the
tribunal is not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law.  It
can confer rights and privileges on either party which it considers reasonable and
proper, though they may not be within the terms of the existing agreement.  It has
not merely to interpret or give effect to the contractual rights and obligations of
the parties.  It can create new rights and obligations between them which it
considers essential for keeping industrial peace."
17
This, then is the definitive thematic of Indian labour law – any labour contract/agreement
can be overridden and redefined on the basis of notions held by the labour courts as to what is
just, fair and expedient.
The Contract of Employment under Common Law and Collective Bargaining
This kind of intervention is quite in contrast to the Common Law perception of the
contract of employment, which is rooted in the general law of contracts.  Common Law sees the
contract of employment as a legally binding agreement between "master and servant" or to state
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it in more contemporary language between employer and employee.  The employer derives a
benefit from the employee working under his directions, and the employee in turn is
compensated  with wages.  One of the corner stones of the Common Law of contracts, is that
contracting parties are free to lay down their own terms and that there can be no intervention by
anyone not party to the contract.   As any standard legal text points out, contracts can be
rescinded only under circumstances where it can be shown that the contract involved fraud,
duress, mistake or misrepresentation.  Thus, the law of contracts does not typically concern itself
with the adequacy of consideration, leaving the contracting parties to make their own bargain,
howsoever inequitable.
As industrialising societies have sought greater equality in society, one institutional
response has been to progressively substitute collective for individual bargaining.
18
Specifically, as regards labour and industrial relations, collective bargaining of some sort has
more or less displaced the master and servant relationship as the rubric around which employers
and workers interact.  Apart from this, the modern welfare state compels the inclusion of
statutory terms along with the terms agreed on by parties.  Typically such terms include the
provision of safe working conditions, reasonable work hours and the payment of minimum
wages.  Though collective bargains of a sort have come to dominate  many of the interactions
between employers and employees all over the world, there is a good deal of variation as to both
the extent to which the law regulates collective bargaining and the manner in which the law
intervenes with the collective bargaining process.  An exhaustive description of the relationship
between the legal system and collective bargaining in various parts of the world cannot be
seriously attempted here, but it is important to mention a couple of broad features present in
diverse legal systems, so as to provide a working comparison with the Indian law.   Two
common features of labour law in most Common Law countries (also many Civil Law
countries) are of particular relevance.  One, a number of legal systems require by statute that the
contracts of employment include certain standardised terms regarding minimum wages, working
hours and safe working conditions.  Second, the process of collective bargaining which has
replaced the individual bargain, involves trade unions as legal representatives of the worker and
the agreements worked out between unions and employers have a legal standing. In other words
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trade unions typically negotiate terms of employment on behalf of individual workers and these
terms are usually enforceable by the courts.
Trade Unions
In India the relationship between employers and employees cannot in general be
described as being confined to a direct bargain between the employer and the trade union.  The
problem stems from the legal framework within which Indian trade unions operate, coupled with
the presence of the State and the Judiciary as additional actors.
According to the Trade Unions Act of 1926, any seven adults can gather and register
themselves as a trade union. As a consequence, independent of the size of membership, all
registered trade unions enjoy the same legal rights, powers and privileges.  Very broadly these
rights include conferring on every trade union the status of a corporate body which can hold
property, contract and litigate.  In addition to this trade unions can call for a strike and, if they do
so, they are exempt from criminal liability.  However, the Trade Unions Act, does not set up any
rules that oblige employers to recognise a particular union as being representative of the workers
interests.  Court decisions have made it very clear that obligatory recognition of a particular
trade union as a bargaining agent is not supported by any law.
19  At the same time Section 36 of
the Industrial Disputes Act states
"A workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any
proceeding under this Act by
(a)any member of the executive or other office bearer of a registered trade union
of which he is a member ;
             (b)any member of the executive or other office bearer of a federation of trade
unions to which the trade union mentioned in clause (a) is affiliated;
(c)where the worker is not a member of any trade union, by any member of the
executive or other office bearer of any trade union connected with or by any
other workman employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and
authorised in such manner as may be prescribed."
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Therefore, it is the volition of the employer to decide who is a representative bargaining agent;
but if a "dispute" arises even the smallest union can bring up the grievances of its members
before the labour department of the local government for conciliation.   As a consequence,
multiple unions can exist, each winning the support of a fraction of the labour force employed in
the concern, and the employer is obliged to deal with all of them.
20  Under this legal framework,
the relationship between an union and an employer cannot be characterised by the usual
understanding of the term - collective bargaining.   Both the sides are not  confined to a
framework where a direct confrontation decides what each side will give and receive, because
each side can always initiate or threaten to initiate the conciliation - adjudication process.
As described earlier, the conciliation - adjudication process involves government
participation at many of the crucial stages of dispute resolution.  The process of conciliation
initially put in the hands of the labour department, may later end up involving the labour
minister or even a higher executive functionary.  Also, as noted earlier, if conciliation is not
successful, the next stage involves the government as well.  It is entirely the discretion of the
government as to whether the dispute is referred for adjudication or not.  Such involvement of
the government at various steps of dispute resolution causes large - scale political interference in
the process.  In fact almost all union activity in India is controlled by prominent political parties
and the independent union movement is quite weak.
21  Political parties see industrial workers as
a source of votes and therefore actively patronise unions.  Unions supported by the ruling party
can look forward to favourable treatment of disputes raised by them.  A study based on a sample
of dispute cases shows that unions affiliated to the ruling party were favoured by referring
demands raised by them for adjudication, while reference of demands raised by rival unions was
wilfully prevented.
22  In a similar manner the government can engineer the progress of a dispute
in favour of an employer who has political patronage.
Adjudication, as conceived by the Industrial Disputes Act, was to have been
procedurally more flexible than civil suit resolution.  However, in practice labour courts and
tribunals have come to follow very strict civil procedures – in the sense that court procedure and
the evidence delivered follow the dictates of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 and the Evidence
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Act I 1872.  It appears that disputes get settled on the basis of legal norms and procedures rather
than on the inherent matter of the case.
23  Thus unions have to be represented by individuals
who are conversant with legal procedures, particularly so in a situation where employers are
represented by advocates.  It has been observed that these legal and political considerations have
given rise to the phenomenon of "outsider union leaders" who man key positions in trade unions.
These individuals, who are not workers, position themselves as having the requisite skill to see
disputes through administrative, political and legal hurdles.  Such outsider union leaders may not
have the interest of workers as their central objective and have been documented as being
susceptible to working out underhand deals with employers that ultimately result in weaker
unions.
24  Of course the exact orientation of such leaders would vary from case to case, but the
point to note is that the relationship between workers and employers is not at all direct.  Instead
the relationship is mediated by a number of exogenous elements that include outsider union
leaders, politicians, judges and administrators.
3. The Problem with Adjudication
Legal scholars have pointed out many problems with adjudication as it has come to be
practised.  Some of these problems are endemic to the Indian legal system such as long term
delays and the fact that there are too few judges and courts in relation to the number of cases.
Current estimates indicate that there are over three lakh cases pending disposal with labour
courts and tribunals.  Once a case is initiated it can take up to ten years for the judgement to be
passed.
25 However there are other specific problems with adjudication that have also been
highlighted.  As has been mentioned earlier, the judges appointed to the labour judiciary are
transferred from the civil judiciary.  It has been noted that labour courts and tribunals emphasise
formal civil court procedure rather than working with a more flexible inquisitorial method which
is more likely to bring out the essential issues in a dispute.  Furthermore, since the judges are
transferred to labour courts and tribunals from civil courts, they are poorly informed about the
issues at stake in labour disputes.  The Industrial Disputes Act does allow for experts to assist
labour tribunals and courts but this option is reported to almost never being exercised.  Instead,
the judge acts as a passive individual, while parties to the dispute present their case in the
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adversarial manner used in civil courts.  Studies based on a sample of cases brought forth for
adjudication indicate that in the proceedings before labour courts, management is represented by
management consultants or lawyers, while workers rely on the outsider union leaders mentioned
earlier, to represent them.
26  If the proceedings are of an adversarial nature, the representatives of
the management are in a better position to present their case than the workers representatives.  If,
this study and other similar works are taken to be representative of the ground realities, it is
ironical that a legal system that jettisoned Common Law doctrines for being iniquitous, ends up
generating iniquitous outcomes because the legal system persists in using Common Law
procedure and is unable to innovate on procedure.
If one were to locate a schematic, within which to position the adjudication process, one
could reflexively categorise the adjudication process as an exercise in arbitration.  The term
arbitration
27 as commonly understood by economists refers to a process where a third party
makes an efficient decision regarding the terms of a contract, which could not or have not been
specified properly by the contracting parties.  A popular Industrial Organisation text maintains
that the most basic requirement for meaningful arbitration is that the arbitrator must make fair,
independent and informed decisions.
28    From the brief description above, interpreting
adjudication as arbitration would be a bit of a misnomer because it is not at all clear that the
system is geared towards making decisions that are necessarily informed.   The contracts
specified by adjudication are most likely not fair - at least not in the sense that fairness
29 in an
arbitrated settlement would be customarily viewed and are unlikely to be economically efficient
as well.  To analyse the labour adjudication process, it is necessary to search for a framework
that is able to incorporate the institutional idiosyncrasies of Indian labour law.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Judiciary, Adjudication and Industrial Justice New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co.
26. Debi S. Saini(1994) "Tribunal Procedure and Approach in Industrial-Disputes Adjudication: Industrial Justice on
Reverse-Value Hypothesis" in Debi S. Saini (ed.) Labour Judiciary, Adjudication and Industrial Justice New Delhi,
Oxford & IBH Publishing Co.
27.The term as it is being used here, should not to be confused with the definition of arbitration as it is set out in the
Industrial Disputes Act.
28. Jean Tirole(1988) The Theory of Industrial Organisation Cambridge The MIT Press 29-30
29. The understanding of fairness here is that the arbitrator will confirm the expectations of the involved parties, in
that he will impose terms that would have been specified in a complete contract. For a further discussion on fairness
see the next section.10
If it is accepted as a premise that there is an intrinsic inequity in the freely drawn up
contract of employment and that some intervention is needed to raise the bargaining power of
labour, then the central issue that comes up is the appropriate form of intervention.  Should
rights of workers be gained prescient to the act of forming a contract or should the State allocate
rights as it sees  fit?  Is it preferable that the State guarantee certain rights while other rights are
gained contractually?  In seeking to answer such questions, given the admixture of normative
and positive considerations that are thrown up, it becomes but essential to evaluate the Indian
labour legislation, in a manner which is at once cognisant of the concerns of justice and the
sense that one is dealing with rational agents who are involved in economic interaction with
each other.  This is a fairly formidable task because apart from the difficulties of conjoining
notions of justice with those of economics, thus far the precursory step of identifying the
positive consequences of the current system of legislation, remain inadequately explored.  As the
brief description of some of the key labour laws and institutions has shown, conflict resolution is
a complex affair - it could possibly be a simple bargaining problem, but the presence of the
Industrial Disputes Act, which cannot be ignored by the parties, can cause employer-employee
interaction to become something far more intricate than a simple bargain.  In the next section,
the Nash bargaining framework, which is customarily viewed as an useful device to address
division problems, is used to enter the conundrum.
4. Nash Bargaining Solution
To begin with, a resume of the Nash bargaining problem expressed in terms of its
essential constituent elements, is in order.
30   The Nash formulation is designed to approach
situations where parties can mutually gain over their current states by co-operating but, run into
conflict since joint decisions need to be made as to the apportioning of gains across parties.
Taking the simplest two party representation for expository ease, the problem is captured in
diagram 1.1.  The axes in the diagram index the utilities - measured in cardinal units, of two
parties A and B.  Point X is the status quo point, which represents the utility levels that the two
parties are obliged to encounter if they do not agree to a co-operative venture, and the points on
the line LM depict the set of Pareto optimal outcomes that could ensue if the two parties agreed
to co-operate.  The problem is that while any of the co-operative outcomes are better than the
option of non co-operation, each point on the co-operative schedule distributes the gains from
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co-operation at the expense of the other party.  Thus this is a problem in search of a solution that
specifies a "bargain" between the contesting parties which divides the co-operative surplus in
some manner.  Nash proposed that a solution to the problem can be gained by maximising the
product of the differences between the utilities from a co-operative outcome and the status quo
outcome.  This solution satisfies a number of formal properties
31 but, apart from noting that the
fulfilment of these properties secures the rigor of the solution, this is not the kind of concern that
is going to be pursued here.  Instead, here one would like to give the Nash construct a run for all
it says or might say in terms of justice.  Before directly relating the Nash solution to any notion
of justice, the ground needs to be established by highlighting the point that the solution is by
construction sensitive to the status quo point.   This manoeuvre links the solution to the
bargaining power of the parties in question. Indeed this is the prominent significance of the Nash
solution - it represents the outcome from among the Pareto optimal outcomes that corresponds to
the balance of the bargaining strengths innate to the situation.
5. Justice and the Nash Bargaining Solution
What, if any, is the connection between this predictive ability of the solution and justice?
One position has been to say that while the Nash solution may adequately predict, there is no
justification for recommending it as an ethical outcome.
32  Apart from cases of conspicuous
inequity, say, to take Sen's example of a worker being offered "subhuman wages and poor terms
of employment" where the status quo dooms him to starvation,
33 it is important in general to
identify the sense of justice incorporated into the Nash formulation altogether more precisely.
Barry points out that the Nash solution belongs to the notion of justice as mutual advantage -
where justice as mutual advantage is the perception of justice as the constraints that rational
people impose on themselves to obtain the co-operation of others, entitling some to have a
greater bargaining power than others.
34  Following Barry, the link between the Nash solution and
justice as mutual advantage is best brought out by positioning the discussion around arbitration.
Rational parties, confronted by the prospect of losing transaction resources in an unfruitful
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endeavour to make a bargain or worse, getting locked into threats that may make them worse off
than before the situation for a co-operative venture came up, could benefit from the offices of an
arbitrator.  In such a situation how can a fair arbitration be personified ?  The answer to this is to
say that fair arbitration will set the outcome to be that which the parties would have themselves
come to; for, if arbitrators were to do otherwise, the institution of arbitration would stand
discredited and it would became less likely to be used in the future - at least so would argue
Hobbes
35 trying to envision the creation of order in a state of nature and, so could one in a
modern society where allocation is subject to bargaining.  To the extent that the Nash solution
can be pre-eminently viewed as the outcome that rational parties given their respective
advantages and disadvantages ought to reach, it represents the fair outcome that justice as
mutual advantage would have us accept.
36  This is a formulation which is quite akin to the
precepts of contract law wherein judges uphold the terms of a contract but do not say anything
about fair division, but if asked to, impose terms that the parties themselves would have agreed
to.
Those who find the notion of justice as mutual advantage unpalatable, obviously do not
see the Nash solution as embodying an acceptable sense of fairness.  For instance Rawls,
37 has
explicitly stated that any solution that is based on threat advantages of contesting parties, is not
acceptable morally.
38  As is well known, his stand is to propose that the ethically correct status
quo is the ‘original position’ - a state envisioned by placing all those who people a society
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behind a veil of ignorance which disallows anyone to be advantaged or disadvantaged by chance
or existing social circumstances and thereupon requiring them to choose the principles of justice.
Thus justice is seen as the substance of an agreement that would be reached by rational people
under conditions that do not allow bargaining power to be translated into an advantage.  Rawls is
primarily being mentioned here in his capacity as one of the prominent critics of the ethics of the
Nash solution - in that the notion of equality encapsulated in the Nash solution is stated to be
indefensible and in turn a theory of justice is presented which is consistent with placing
bargaining agents on more equal terms.  The moot point to note here is that, since the problem of
equality has been solved by placing everyone behind the ‘veil of ignorance’, and the interaction
between bargaining agents is as between rational beings, the Nash solution continues to predict
outcomes but is now shorn of its normative problems.  In other words, the Rawlsian theory of
justice in itself does not propose to direct bargaining between individuals in society as a means
of effecting just outcomes, contrary to Indian labour law which seeks to intervene directly with
the contracting process to manufacture just outcomes.
While no easily discernible formal theory of justice can be said to be behind the
constructs of Indian labour law, as the depiction of the law in the previous section has suggested,
the genesis of a distinct Indian labour law is rooted in a concern about the inequality of
bargaining power between industrial labour and their employers.  In key judgements a discontent
has repeatedly been voiced over treating labour contracts under the aegis of conventional
standards of contract law; which in turn apropos to the discussion on the sense of justice innate
to the Nash bargaining problem, can be interpreted as expressing disagreement with notion of
justice that drives the Nash solution.   To remedy the inequality in bargaining power, the
Industrial Disputes Act suggests third party(possibly fourth, fifth … party)intervention to effect
a just outcome when negotiating parties explicitly admit to division problems.  Thus if one uses
the Nash representation of the bargaining problem as the basic analytical unit to approach the
bargaining problem among industrial labour and their employers in India, the impact of the
Indian labour legislation is best seen as redefining the status quo in a recondite manner.  This
manipulation of the status quo is performed by allowing the contesting parties to make selective
and simultaneously strategic use of rights that have been given to them by legislation.  The
nature of these rights is idiosyncratic in that they are not the conventionally alienable rights such
as those that cover property, but are rather rights that are gained by selective mediation of the
State and its functionaries.   Once such rights are gained, the process of intervention can
culminate with the labour courts designing what are best labelled as exogenous contracts -14
termed so since the contract is specified by a body other than the contractors.  This act of
mediation also has the added distinction that, what is essentially a dyadic problem is converted
into a multidimensional problem - one which necessitates an interplay between many objective
functions.
The account of the actions of contesting parties provided in the first part of this essay,
makes it quite clear that both employers and workers possess a number of avenues to engineer
outcomes by expending resources.  In addition to pitting one union against another aided by the
trade union law, employers can influence outcomes by networking with politicians and
administrators since the government is crucially involved in taking a number of decisive actions
at a number of stages of the adjudicating process.  In addition to this investment in the services
of corporate labour lawyers is yet another mean through which outcomes can be masterminded.
Similarly, workers and worker organisations also use political networks and solicit the services
of "outsider union leaders" to influence outcomes.
One can schematise this by trying to note the implications of these networks on the
bargaining outcome.  Interpreted within the construct of the bargaining problem, the bundle of
rights that allow these networks to form and be manoeuvred, transform the status quo as it is
specified in the conventional bargaining problem.  Under Indian labour law, the status quo
cannot quite be defined in terms of payoffs accruing to the contesting parties in the absence of an
agreement, because the structure of rights advanced by the law allows either party the option of
refusing a co-operative outcome in anticipation of an exogenous contract.  The status quo under
such institutional constraints is transformed into an entity which is better defined in terms of the
potential threats that can be made by any one of the parties in the quest to push the case towards
adjudication.  Such threats are not easy to formalise because they cannot be captured altogether
in terms of the utilities of the contesting parties since, the threats involve an interplay with the
objective functions of the intervening bodies who play a role in allocating rights to the
contesting parties.  Nonetheless, a heuristic attempt can be made to capture the consequences of
the labour adjudication process on eventual outcomes.
6. Adjudication and the Nash Bargaining Solution
Before proceeding on the strategies of the disputants, a general point needs to be made –
the exogenous contracts created by the Industrial Disputes Act are very likely in themselves to15
represent economically inefficient outcomes.  This is so because the true contents of the core can
only be known to the parties aspiring to an agreement, or to put it differently, efficiency may be
a professed consideration for the contracting parties but, there is no guarantee that those
involved in the adjudication process are going to pursue ends that ensure the group rationality of
the contractors.  As rational beings, the ends pursued by those involved in the adjudication
process are more likely to be in the direction of retaining political power, maximising returns
from bribes, appearing just, being promoted to a better post or whatever else politicians,
administrators, union leaders or judges aspire towards.  The point also being, that given the place
that such parties occupy in the structure of things, they are not liable to be weeded out, as would
inefficient arbitrators in the Hobbesian prediction.  If per chance some adjudicating body is
moved to be just and efficient, there persist the many problems of processing data by central
authorities.
39  The data that would trickle down to the many bodies involved in adjudication,
would be liable to enter as some form of "statistics" which have been created by lumping over
disparate categories, distorting the actual relation between things.  Thus the decisions made by
even the most assiduous adjudicating body, cannot ensure the efficiency that would follow from
interaction between individual and therefore group rational contractors.  One is compelled to ask
then, under what conditions, if any, efficient outcomes can be expected under Indian labour law.
To do this is to enter the opaque territory of specifying the non co-operative game that
accurately models the bargaining process.  Now, to formally capture the process of bargaining is
difficult under the simplest of circumstances and is bound to be particularly intractable when the
bargaining process is made subject to the structural constraints of Indian labour law.  It could of
course be rewarding to attempt a formal model of the bargaining process, but even without
undertaking such a venture, some insights are possible; albeit, with some abuse to the graphical
representation of the Nash solution.
In diagram 1.2 let D be a status quo point - defined in the standard manner, and C1-C2
the set of potentially efficient bargains.  If neither of the parties take the division problem to a
third party, the outcome is, say, given by point L - the Nash solution. Imagine now that party A,
strengthened by the accoutrements offered by Indian labour law, moves unilaterally to push the
case for adjudication, with the hope of gaining some advantageous terms from an exogenous
contract.  Assume also for the moment, that party A can anticipate perfectly the exogenous
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contract based on some amalgam of the deduced behaviour of those who will set the “contract”.
Let such an anticipated exogenous contract, be represented by point Q in the diagram.  Then, if
Party B were to also anticipate the very same exogenous contract Q, point Q converts into a new
“status quo”  - or to use a more appropriate term advanced by the bargaining literature – an
outside-option pair
40 and the two parties could be perceived of as bargaining over some
outcome along curve TR.  If this were so, it could be said that the law has both empowered party
A and enabled the predicted outcome of bargaining to be efficient.  An alternate perception of
point Q is to view Q not as a representation of an anticipated exogenous contract, but rather as
the actual terms of an exogenous contract, set as an outcome at the culmination of a judicial
procedure.  If Q is understood in this manner, the two parties come to be stuck with outcome Q,
because typically parties are not allowed to renegotiate the terms set by the labour court. Such an
outcome is of course inefficient, but with the nebulous potential of transforming into an efficient
outcome in the indefinite future.  It is important here to be clear about the distinction between Q
as a point reflecting the outside-option principle from which the two parties bargain as a part of
the initial bargaining process and Q as an exogenous contract outcome from which a subsequent
bargaining exercise can be initiated sometime in the future.  The former representation of Q as
makes sense only if both Party A and Party B know that Q will be the exogenous contract and
both the parties know that the other party knows that Q will be the exogenous contract and so on
– in other words the parties have common knowledge of Q.  The interpretation of the latter
representation of Q is, as an outcome of some non co-operative interaction between the two
parties.  Now, whatever is plausible from the viewpoint of Party A should also be plausible for
Party B, which could also push the case for adjudication.  From the standpoint of Party B, one
can think of an exogenous contract S, construed in the manner of point Q.  The point S, as is the
case with  Q, can be interpreted in two ways.  If all parties have common knowledge of S, then S
would become the outside-option point and the two parties could bargain over co-operative
outcomes WX. If this were so, it could be said the law has empowered Party B and, the eventual
bargaining outcome could again be efficient.  On the other hand if S is viewed as the actual
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outcome of an adjudication process, we have an inefficient outcome that has the shadowy
possibility of being transformed into an efficient outcome sometime in the future.
The interpretation of points Q or S as outside-option pairs is in all probability untenable,
since undeniably, the design of Indian labour law constrains the information sets of all agents.
This in turn implies that the possibility of having it all – empowerment and efficiency – under
the confines of the law can be more or less precluded; points such as Q or S are best interpreted
as actual, judicially determined, outcomes.  To commence on an intuitive analysis of such
outcomes, assume that for some reason parties A and B are unable to come up with a co-
operative agreement.  The reasons for such an inability would be immaterial – any one or any
number of diverse contingencies would do.  For example, one of the parties may value an
anticipated exogenous contract over a co-operative outcome because greater gains are likely to
accrue following the former course or the time frame of the bargaining exercise is proving too
costly.  Under any such condition, empowered by the rights given by Indian labour law, assume
that one of the parties acts unilaterally to seek out an exogenous contract, say Party A seeks out
Q in diagram 1.2.  This course of action will be pursued so long as the benefits from the
anticipated exogenous contract outstrip the costs of engineering such a “contract”.  If one party
has initiated such an action the other is also bound to respond to seek a more advantageous
outcome to itself, say S in the diagram.   Now the precise manner in which the ultimate
exogenous contract is set is very hard to discern a priori, but functionally it can be suggested that
the final exogenous contract is in some sense related to the resources expended by both parties.
Each party can be seen as trying to seek a favourable outcome through the mediation of
politicians, administrators, corporate lawyers and outsider union leaders, described earlier.  Since
the exogenous contract is engineered through the agency of such actors, it can be claimed that
there is a functional relationship between what each party expends and the exogenous contract,
though the precise response to such expenditure will vary with the specifics of the case.  While
all parties may be aware of such relations, they may not be able to simultaneously and precisely
predict the exogenous contract; for if they could, this would have led to a co-operative solution.
Each party functioning with its own set of tactical private information and networks, which the
other party cannot be fully cognisant of, will solicit a particular contract and the adjudicating
body will deliver some contract depending on the resources expended, say Y.  Such a point Y is
bound to be sub - optimal, in so much so as it lies inside the frontier.  Thus the statement that
emerges is that - Indian labour law provides workers and their employers with idiosyncratic18
rights that encourage non co-operative outcomes, where otherwise with a more conventional
rights entitlement, co-operative outcomes are more likely to prevail.
To the extent that the results insinuated here are akin to those predicated in Prisoners
Dilemma problems, repeated plays may lead to co-operative outcomes.  However, while such
plays are being repeated, there is bound to be substantial loss of resources, because with every
move, agents have to expend large sums on the numerous intermediaries that man the
adjudication machinery.  A recent longitudinal study of industrial relations in one firm, spanning
a period of twenty years, shows that it takes a very long time for players to realise that direct
interaction between labour and management is preferable to third party intervention.
41  Thus in
terms of Diagram 1.2, the two parties may just reach the frontier from Y at some point in time,
but in the meantime the social loss in terms of resources expended on the bargaining process
may have outstripped the social gains of reaching the frontier.  This is obviously a manifestation
of the ubiquitous rent-seeking behaviour that the Indian liberalisation endeavour has somewhat
stalled in the product markets, but continues to be endemic in determining outcomes in the
labour market.
To highlight yet another source of inefficiency, one can invoke a model of the
contracting process suggested by Coleman.
42  Following Coleman, the process of contract
formation can be seen as the resolution of three distinct but interconnected problems of co-
operation, division and compliance.   The first sequential step is for parties to recognise
opportunities for co-operative gain, followed by a decision on the division of the gain and the
final step consists of  mutual compliance of the terms that have been agreed upon.  Now, since
decisions taken at an earlier phase in the contracting process depend on expectations regarding
decisions at a later stage, the order in which parties safeguard their interests is the reverse.  If
there is some apprehension among the contracting parties about a later stage in the contracting
process, say non-compliance of agreed terms, then the fear of outcomes worse than status quo
could inhibit contract formation.  Much of the substantive content of contract law such as the
doctrines that cover breach of contract can be seen from this perspective - as essential safeguards
against defection.  By analogy, to the extent agents working under the shadow of Indian labour
law look out and see unfavourable outcomes, they are bound to reject the initiation of many co-
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operative ventures. Put another way, by offering detrimental ex-post resolutions, the Industrial
Disputes Act ends up affecting the ex-ante behaviour of agents, resulting in a substantial loss to
the sum of co-operative undertakings that could have been secured.
It is also not unequivocal that the current structure of dispute resolution necessarily leads
to equitable results.  In the final analysis of things, the mode of intervention with the division
problem does not resolve the problem of inequity between workers and employers because
employers often have better resources and networks to take on the adjudication process.  Apart
from the obvious advantages gained by employers on account of possessing superior resources,
yet another source of inequity is the endemically slow processing of cases by the judicial
machinery.  Such delays can and often do work to the detriment of workers and to the advantage
of employers.  The quest for equitable outcomes is probably better met by giving workers
endowments and entitlements that act to consolidate their bargaining power.  It may be argued
that by seeking a unilateral outcome some labour group is able to alter its position and indeed it
may, but to borrow a point made by Sen in the context of gender inequality, this is performed by
treating labour as one would a "patient" rather than as an "agent".
43  Expanding the agency of
labour by empowering them as a group is a far more preferable device, than the ad-hoc tinkering
favoured by the Indian legal system.   Indeed, the substance of Sen's analysis of gender
inequalities has significant bearing on the inequity faced by labour.  Sen has suggested that the
co-operative bargaining model is a useful device to study gender inequality because of its ability
to capture elements of co-operation and conflict simultaneously, though he maintains that the
information base of standard bargaining models consisting only of utility information, may be
unduly restrictive.  Instead he calls for a more plural information base which incorporates a more
‘objective’ notion of well being.  For instance, in relation to gender inequalities, he points out
that the manner in which women value their worth, in terms of their well being and contribution
to the household, affects the construction of the status quo or breakdown position.  Thus a
woman who values her own well-being below the interests of others in her household or does
not perceive of herself as contributing to the economic prosperity of her household, is in a more
vulnerable position than a woman who is able to value these aspects of her life in a better light.
Such concerns are manifestly related to the levels of education and productive employment
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opportunities available to women, because access to such possibilities can only act to improve
their status quo or breakdown positions.  Correspondingly, the status quo of workers as a group
can be influenced by a host of circumstances that can raise their well-being, say, by increasing
productive employment opportunities, by encouraging norms that work in favour of collective
bargaining and by legally ensuring good working conditions for all workers.  It is the witting
point of this paper to suggest that future discourse on Indian labour law be re-oriented in this
direction.21
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